Vince Flynn needs to do some basic research on the Philippines

After the failure of US Navy Seals to rescue American hostages held by Abu Sayyaf, Mitch Rapp, CIA’s top counterterrorist agent-turned bureaucrat, has to come to the Philippines to do the job himself. He rooted out the traitors from within the US State Department and their accomplice in the Philippines, wiped out the band of kidnappers or terrorists, and foiled a larger global menace whose tentacles traces back to the corridors of money and power in the Middle East.

Classic Vince Flynn!

But my praises stop there. It’s obvious that Flynn has zero knowledge of Philippine geography.

Consider this: Abu Sayyaf snatched the hostages from Samar and brought them to their supposed lair in Dinagat Island. Seriously? Could you imagine the presence of Abu Sayyaf in Dinagat Island? Flyn’s Abu Sayyaf speaks “Filipino.” If he did simple research, he will know without much effort that Abu Sayyaf operates largely in Basilan and Sulu areas. They speak their own dialects (mostly Tausug or Yakan) and not Tagalog or Filipino.

They could never thrive in Dinagat due to ethnic, language or even religious differences, not to mention the constraints of physical terrain (unless you consider the island's natural bonsai forests as good shelter for guerillas). Dinagatnons are mostly Visayans (Surigaonons).

The supposed accomplice in the Philippines is named General “Moro.” Another character is named General “Rizal.” Both surnames are not used in the Philippines. Not anymore.

Of course, it's fiction. But fiction could use accurate background information to be credible.

Come on, Vince! You can do better than that.

After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads

Review
After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads
By Francis Fukuyama, 2006
Profile Books Limited, 226 pages

“Neoconservatism” as a way of thinking is a mishmash of contradicting social and foreign policy ideas originated by some New York City intellectuals who used to worship Leon Trotsky, Vladimir Lenin’s buddy who espoused “world proletarian revolution.” How these once communist intellectuals and their thoughts permeated into America’s foreign policy during the administration of George W. Bush and brought the world’s superpower to a disastrous misadventure in Iraq and the Middle East, therefore, is a very compelling story. In his latest book After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads, Francis Fukuyama, political scientist and a former neocon himself, tells us this story with great depth and forceful insights, then proceeded to disavow and castigate the movement that he was once a proud member of.

Fukuyama traces the origins of neoconservative thinking to a group of working class intellectuals studying at the City College of New York in the 30s. They were once Marxists who turned to the right shade of the political spectrum following Trotsky’s exposes of Joseph Stalin’s brutality. Thus from being ardent supporters of socialism, these intellectuals, mostly Jews, became haters of communism and bitter critiques of “social engineering” programs and social planning that they thought tend to create unintended social consequences that make societies even worse off. When America joined the Allies to defeat Germany and Japan during World War II, the neocons started to see American military power as a force for good, something that America’s leaders should use to transform the world in an exercise of “benevolent hegemony.”

Neocons, having taken some pages from Plato and Aristotle, believe that “regime” or the internal character of states matter in foreign relations. “Rogue states” are likely to become a destabilizing force in global affairs, as “regimes that treat their own citizens unjustly are likely to do the same to foreigners.” America and her allies usually deal with these totalitarian and tyrannical states through carrot and stick but said measures are likely to be ineffective, according to the neocons. The best way out therefore is through changing the “underlying nature of that regime,” a phrase that translates into what is known as “regime change” under the Bush administration.

Prior to the collapse of Berlin Wall, foreign policy circles in Washington DC didn’t really take the neocons seriously even if their views fitted well with Ronald Reagan’s Cold War rhetoric about the Soviet Union as “evil empire.” The more credible voice then were the “realists” in the tradition of Henry Kissinger who respect power, downplay human rights as well as the internal character of states. For the realists, all states whether liberal democratic or authoritarian, seek and power and America and other democratic societies have to accommodate them.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the influence of neocons soared, vindicated as they were with the fact that the communist threat didn’t vanish through containment and détente as proffered by foreign policy “realists” but by the transformation of Eastern Europe and Russia into “democratic states.” It was a profound lesson Fukuyama thinks that Neocons—deeply ensconced into the mainstream foreign policy establishment under George W. Bush—wrongly applied in a world that has drastically changed since 911.

For Fukuyama, the Neocons, in a rapidly globalizing world, have failed to appreciate the growing influence and power of non-state actors (e.g. terrorists groups like Al Qaeda and Hamas) that couldn’t be deterred by conventional military forces. They have overestimated the capacity of the American military that, while unmatched in the conventional and high-tech warfare, was not prepared to deal with insurgency and the task of nation building. Neoconservatism, he argues, has proved contradictory in the real world in that, while neoconservatives loathe social planning and “nation-building,” measures toward these ends are necessary if Bush’s democratization project in Iraq and Middle East has to succeed.

The Neocons assumed that the world will buy the idea of America’s “benevolent hegemony” and confer her actions—clothed with scary rhetoric about preemptive wars against the axis of evil—with legitimacy, unmindful of the fact that anti-Americanism had been brewing all over the world decades prior to the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Anti-Americanism—Fukuyama contends—came about as a result of several factors, among them the American-led IT revolution and globalization that are perceived by Europeans as threats to the European welfare state system, the uneven result of “Washington consensus” (i.e. structural adjustment loans that tried to foster market-driven policies) in Latin America, and the Asian financial crises precipitated by American pressure to open up financial markets without adequate safeguards.

This book is Fukuyama’s way of explaining why he turn-coated on the neoconservative movement. And yet, he remained a Neocon in essence, warning against the greater dangers of American isolationism following the debacle in Iraq. This time, however, he labels his new advocacy as “realistic Wilsonianism” characterized by the greater reliance on soft power, the promotion of economic and political development worldwide, and the creation of legitimate international institutions that could respond effectively vis-à-vis global threats and issues emerging out in this brave new world of globalization and technological change.

Readers won’t probably agree with all the things that Fukuyama say in this book, but this piece of work once again seems to prove why many think Fukuyama is one of most engaging thinker and analyst of this era. It’s his finest piece since his equally controversial work, The End of History and the Last Man, came almost two decades ago. It’s a must-read for all those who want to understand the nature of America’s foreign policy after 9/11 and figure out where it is heading for.

Of rebels, insurgents and terrorists: a book review

ARE YOU LOOKING for clues as to the possible outcome of the American “democratization project” in Iraq? Try reading David Rooney’s “Guerilla: insurgents, rebels and terrorists from Sun Tzu to Bin Laden” (Brasseys UK, 2004). This book tells as about the history as well as the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare from the ancient days up to the present, featuring a major cast of colorful characters including Judah Maccabee of ancient Israel, the Boer commandos, Michael Collins of Irish Republican Army, Lawrence of Arabia, Giuseppe Garibaldi of Italy, the Chindits of Burma, Mao Zedong, Joseph Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Che Guevarra, and Osama Bin Ladin. Reading the book, one couldn’t help but conclude that the Americans in Iraq will eventually have to leave—and leave in disgrace.

It’s because guerrillas are usually effective when the raison d’etre of the guerrilla struggle is the presence of a foreign occupier. There’s an overwhelming proof for this: Spanish guerrillas drove away Napoleon Bonaparte out of Spain, the Boers brought the British to the negotiating table and got the status of a free state, Michael Collins forced the British to negotiate for the eventual creation of an independent albeit divided Ireland, Mao help drive away the Japanese eventually capture state power, Tito drove the Germans and became Yugoslavia’s head of state, the VietCong drove the Americans away out of Vietnam, mujahideens drove the Russians back home.

There’s no secret to guerrilla tactic employed. Rooney said all these successful guerrillas adhered to the concepts first codified by Sun Tzu and little has changed since then: the use of terrain, mobility, deception, surprise attack and dispersal, avoiding set battles, the use of secure base, and swimming like fish in the water (the masses), persistence, discipline, the role of propaganda and psychological warfare, among many others. Most of the successful practitioners adapted Sun Tzu’s concepts to specific terrain and context but the basic doctrines haven’t changed. Mao summarized it so well: “when the enemy attacks, we retreat or disperse; when the enemy encamps, we harass; when the enemy runs, we pursue; and when the enemy tires, we go for the kill.”

Bin Ladin however added a new dimension-- religion, thus making guerrilla warfare an even more potent weapon among the discontented and the fanatics. If Bin Laden and Al Qaeda succeeds in getting weapons of mass destruction especially nukes, he might just redefine guerilla warfare to the world's peril.

The determined guerrilla sometimes wins not because of decisive military victories but because foreign occupiers eventually have to leave. And they do leave earlier than expected when they realized it’s no longer politically prudent to stay a minute longer because citizens and politicians back home are increasingly grumbling about the huge expenses in terms of lives, money and materiel.

General Giap’s army in Vietnam was practically broken during the Tet Offensive and the Americans could have given it a coup d’ grace but the citizens back home have had enough of the carnage, mayhem, and body bags. So the Americans had to leave—and they left ignominiously.

Not all guerilla movements succeed though. An example of this is the defeat of the Communist guerrillas in the Federation of Malaya, now Malaysia, by the British SAS and local troops. But the defeated guerillas are not at all discussed at length, thus giving us a bit one-sided view of the whole issue. The discussion of failed guerrilla movements could have given us deeper and balanced insights as to factors that determine success and failure in guerrilla warfare.

But overall though the book is a good read, despite occasional lapses in grammar and editing. And it could be disturbing to those who are in the business of protecting the status quo.

Guerrilas, patriots, and terrorists in a flat world

If there’s such a thing as “book addiction,” I may qualify as an “addict.” I should always have something to read, something very interesting, or I get depressed. I went home nights ago feeling the blues and I was wondering why. Then I realized it’s been several days since I’ve finished Machiavelli and Adam Smith. I knew right then I needed a visit to Powerbooks.

And look what I got lately!: “Guerilla: insurgents, patriots, and terrorists from Sun Tzu to Bin Laden” by David Rooney and “The world is flat” by Thomas Friedman! Powerbooks was having a sale and I got significant (at least 20 percent) discounts.

I got Guerilla because I’m fascinated with these types of people (in the same manner that I’m interested about snipers, ninjas, spies and spec ops). Guerillas are among the hardiest and the most tenacious of peoples in this world. They are creative and determined beings who struggled, persevered, adapted well to local terrain and give hell to technologically and numerically superior foes. Contrary to popular notions, most guerrilla movements are defeated (e.g. Che Guevarra in Bolivia, the Huks in the Philippines, Sandino in Nicaragua, the Communist Party of Malaya, etc) but some of them actually triumphed (e.g. Mao, Tito, Garibaldi, and Spanish guerrillas against Napoleon). Not that I fancy becoming one; I simply think I could use some lessons from their struggles in dealing with my own little adversities in life.

So all over the rainy weekend, I was communing with guerrillas, patriots, and terrorists while heavy rains were mercilessly pounding the roof.

Regarding Friedman, many academic types think his “world is flat” thesis is crap. In fact, its probably more like spiky, meaning that the distribution of the gains of globalization are often concentrated in a few global cities. But I just need to read him before making my own judgment. I need to read the book because it seems everybody else has already read it. I've read Friedman's "The Lexus and the Olive Tree" about globalization eons ago and it would be a shame if I miss on this one which is supposedly a sequel.

And then yesterday, I got Fareed Zakaria’s “The Future of Freedom” tackling the rise of “illiberal democracy” all over the world. Hmm, too little time, to many books to read.

Amartya Sen's "Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny"

When Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington released the book “The Clash of Civilization,” I was wondering whether or not he was correct. I was hoping he was wrong because if he was right, then the world’s "civilizations"—Western, Islamic, Hindu, Chinese, etc.—are destined to clash. When terrorists slammed those planes into the World Trade Center in 9/11, my fears about his thesis grew.

Well, Huntington is wrong says Amartya Sen in his latest book “Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny.” Released in 2006, Sen argues that possession of a unique identity is an illusion because in the real world, people define themselves in a variety of ways through class, gender, profession, language, literature, science, music, morals, politics, among many others. Defining people based on a single identity anchored on religion or “civilization” is not only conceptually flawed but dangerous as it sustains violence and ethnic strife, more so when this concept is elevated into high theory (Just like what Huntington did). Anchoring one’s identity on an overarching culture or civilization denies us the possibility of reasoned choices as to how we define ourselves.

Written in deeply philosophical fashion and beautiful prose, Sen overturns the usual stereotypes as the ‘monolithic Middle East” or “the Western Mind” or “Asian values” and provide us a way of attaining peace through the respect of humanity and diversity of others.

Blogging is "prosuming": a review of Alvin Toffler's Revolutionary Wealth"

Do you sometimes feel that institutions (education, the courts, labor unions, Church, politics, marriage, and the economy) in our midst are unraveling and can’t seem to cope with society’s emerging problems? Do you wonder whether or not power relationships among people and within organizations are changing? Do you increasingly feel stressed out by the bewildering speed of change in the workplace and in society as a whole? Do you increasingly feel that uncertain about the economic prospects of your country?

If many are asking these questions, it’s because—according to futurist Alvin Toffler in his book Revolutionary Wealth: How it will be created and it will change our lives—our relationship to “deep fundamentals” like time, space, and knowledge are rapidly transforming, thanks to the accelerating revolution in information technology. And while there are emerging challenges, the same transformation under way are actually ushering a new way of creating wealth that could potentially alter our lives for the better.

Because of the information revolution, economic transactions are getting faster and some are desynchronizing. For instance, new financial instruments are emerging to the consternation of bureaucrats who discover that existing laws are inadequate as basis for regulations. Textbooks are increasingly becoming obsolete with the emergence of new knowledge and information that are published daily in the Internet. The spatial dimensions of economic activities are also changing with wealth creation increasingly shifting towards the Asia-Pacific Region. Because of breakthroughs in digitalization, it’s easier to shift economic activities to low-cost locations and that’s creating lots of insecurities in the West. Wealth itself is increasingly determined by knowledge and innovation but knowledge itself and tools to generate it are transforming fast.

This sounds unsettling for people who long for stability and progress. But Toffler says mankind’s march to prosperity is set to continue and accelerate through the phenomenon he calls “prosuming.” Increasingly, people are creating their own products and consuming them.

Examples of presuming include parenting, blogging, designing open source software, caring for the sick for free, volunteering for worthy causes, among others, and a lot other activities that are currently not reflected in the money economy. Prosuming is set to explode to generate “revolutionary wealth,” especially as presuming enters the money economy. To those who are skeptical comes his reminder that the billions created by Napster, YouTube and Google started as hobbies by kids who were just trying to enjoy themselves.

This book could sometimes be a difficult read especially because one needs to recall certain ideas he introduced in his earlier works. It is necessarily difficult to present ideas that are supposed to usher us towards the future. Thus Toffler tends to cite so many examples and keep on repeating the outline of the book and keep us on track with the flow of his ideas. But overall, I recommend this book for anyone who wants to divine the future. I feel I’m a totally different person after reading it. You will see trends and events differently after reading this one.